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Bank-Customer Relations Under the Uniform
Commercial Code*
HENRY D. CoLuINs**
Prior to the enactment of the American Bankers' Association
sponsored Bank Collection Code' in 1931, except for the relevant
provisions of the Negotiable Instrument Law, West Virginia had
only a few commonly-enacted statutes dealing with the depositor-
bank relationship and the bank collection process. The miscellany
of statutes cover such matters as specifying the extent of bank
liability for payment of forged or raised checks and for wrongful
nonpayment of checks,' permitting a collecting bank to send items
direct to the payor bank,3 specifying the recognition to be given
to deposits in trust and authorizing joint tenancy accounts, 4 per-
mitting payment of deposits to minors,' specifying procedure and
time limits for stop-payment orders or countermand of check or
draft,6 authorizing the dishonor of a stale check or draft,7 and
specifying circumstances justifying refusal to pay where there are
adverse claims to bank credits.'
The pre-Bank Collection Code era decisional law of West
Virginia on the depositor-bank relationship and the bank collec-
*This is one of a series of studies of the Uniform Commercial Code and
existing West Virginia law. Unlike other articles in this series, the present
article will not reproduce all the Code provisions in full and will not make
a section by section comparison of the Code and existing West Virginia law
with respect to all sections of the Code. Such a detailed treatment would
not be possible nor fruitful in view of the relatively few cases on the subject
in West Virginia and the absence of any unique statutory provisions. Rather
attention will be directed to those provisions of the Code of most interest
to the larger segment of the bar representing the bank customer. All refer-
ences to the Uniform Commerejal Code are to the official edition of 1958. It
will be cited throughout in the footnotes as U.C.C. References to Comments
are to the official Comments accompanying the Code provisions.
"0 Professor of Law, West Vir ia University.
' W. VA. CODE, ch. 31, art. 4A rMichie 1961).2W. VA. CODE, ch. 31, art. 8, § 21 (Michie 1961).
3 W. VA. CODE, ch. 31, art. 8, § 22 (Michie 1961). Prior case law held it
was negligence for a collecting bank to send checks direct to a drawee bank
irrespective of local custom and regardless of the fact the drawee bank was the
only bank in the area. Pinkney v. Kanawha Valley Bank, 68 W. Va. 254, 69
S.E. 1012 (1910).4 W. VA. CODE, ch. 31, art. 8, § 23 (Michie 1961).
5 
W. VA. CODE, ch. 31, art. 8, § 24 (Michie 1961).
6 W. VA. CODE, ch. 31, art. 8 § 26 (Michie 1961).7 W. VA. CODE, ch. 31, art. 8, § 27 (Michie 1961).
8 W. VA. CODE, ch. 31, art. 8, § 28 (Michie 1961).
[ 657 1
1
Collins: Bank-Customer Relations under the Uniform Commercial Code
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1962
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
tion process is sparse, but, for the period, unusually appreciative
of the need for protecting the banks in collection work to facil-
itate rapid transmission of commercial paper.' But, nevertheless,
some of the rules were narrowly and technically interpreted. For
example, the next-day, or two-day rule for forwarding paper for
presentment to out-of-town banks was construed to require for-
warding of the item at least by the last mail train at the close of
business on the second day even though a mailing on an early
train on the third day would allow the item to reach the payor
bank before opening for business on the third day."0 It was recog-
nized that the crediting of the customer's account for the amount
of an item deposited for collection was provisional until the money
called for by the item was actually collected" or until the payor
bank debited the account of the drawer and credited the collecting
bank."2 Accordingly, on the one hand, the depositor-customer
could exercise a right of rescission he might have if the collecting
bank failed before collection was made,' 3 and, on the other hand,
the collecting bank had a right of charge back against the customer-
depositor's account if the paper were dishonored or the payor bank
failed before collection.' 4 Direct sending of an item to the payor
bank was negligence on the part of the collecting bank, irrespective
of local custom or the fact that the payor bank was the only bank
in the area,'5 the usual but cumbersome common law rule which
persisted in West Virginia until 1925.6 The more liberal rule was
adopted which permitted a collecting bank to accept in settlement
the remitting bank's own primary obligation, such as its cashier's
check.' With respect to rights of third parties, the form of the
9 See Carroll v. Exchange Bank, 30 W. Va. 518, 4 S.E. 440 (1887),
favoring the collecting bank over the true owner of item where collecting bank
had credited the transmitting bank with proceeds of item, endorsed in blank
to transmitting bank by true owner and where transmitting bank and collecting
bank had mutual and extensive dealings between them for several years in
negotiable paper which on its face always appeared to be the property of the
respective banks. See also Cattaruzza v. First Nat'l Bank, 106 W. Va. 458,
146 S.E. 393 (1928), which adopted the more liberal view permitting the
collecting bank to accept the cashier's check of the payor bank in settlement
for an item.
10 Pinkney v. Kanawha Valley Bank, supra note 3.
"1 See Alleman v. Sayre, 79 W. Va. 763, 91 S.E. 805 (1917).
12 See Pinkney v. Kanawha Valley Bank, supra note 3.
'a See Alleman v. Sayre, supra note 11.
14 See Pinkney v. Kanawha Valley Bank, supra note 3; Cattaruzza v.
First Nat'l Bank, supra note 9.
'4 Pinkney v. Kanawha Valley Bank, supra note 3.
16 See W. VA. CODE, ch. 8, § 22 (Michie 1961), authorizing direct send-
ing where the drawee or payor bank is situate in another town.
'1 See Cattaruzza v. First Nat'l Bank, supra note 9.
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indorsement used by the depositor was determinative of the own-
ership of the deposited item, with a blank indorsement conferring
title upon the depositary bank while an indorsement "For collec-
tion" created an agency relationship.' 8
Given such a paucity of case law and statutes, why did the
customer-bank relationship and bank collection process work out
so well in West Virginia, as in other states, prior to 1931? The
answer, of course, lies in the highly successful functioning of the
Federal Reserve System. Acting as a clearing house for its mem-
ber banks and accepting for exchange or collection the checks and
drafts of nonmember banks as well and operating under the Federal
Reserve Board of Governor's Regulation G (dealing with collec-
tion of noncash items) and Regulation J (dealing with check
clearing and collection), each Federal Reserve bank issued "oper-
ating letters" prescribing the terms and conditions under which it
would handle items. These "operating letters", being uniform to
a large extent, soon became a standard manual of operations for
bank collections throughout the country in interstate, intercity and
intertown operations, supplemented by generally uniform rules of
the various voluntary clearing house associations functioning with-
in single cities and metropolitan areas.' 9 In addition it was the
practice of banks before the Bank Collection Code to state in
legends upon signature cards, deposit slips, bank statements, col-
lection letters and other form agreements, the terms upon which
items would be accepted for collection, a practice not always
sustained by case law.2
The adoption of the Bank Collection Code in West Virginia,2 '
and seventeen other states, provided a rather extensive set of bank
collection rules based upon the actual manner in which bank col-
lections were performed,2 thus filling the many gaps in our
statutory and case law on the subject. That the Bank Collection
Code has worked well in West Virginia over the past thirty years
is evidenced by the fact there appears but one case 3 in the Michie
18 See Carroll v. Exchange Bank, supra note 9.
'9 See Malcolm, Article 4-A Battle With Complexity, 1952 Wis L. REV.265.
20 Id. at 266.
21 W. VA CODE, ch. 31, art. 4A (Michie 1961) (enacted in 1931).
22 See Malcolm, op. cit. supra note 19, at 266.
23 See Metropolitian Life Ins. Co. v. Lamb, 117 W. Va. 306, 185 S.E. 197
(1936), holding W. VA. CODE, ch. 31, art. 4A, §13 (trust fund theory where
agent collecting bank failed after receiving proceeds of item) applicable only
to commercial paper in the ordinary course of banking business, thus not
applicable where bank was acting as special agent of mortgagee in making
installment loan collections from mortgagors.
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annotations to the relevant Article 4A of Chapter 31. Only one
amendment has been made to the Bank Collection Code, that being
to permit deferred posting in 1949.24
When it was decided to draft one statute covering the entire
field of commercial law, if negotiable instruments were to be in-
cluded, it became necessary to include the subject of bank deposits
and bank collections too, for the conversion of negotiable instru-
ments into bank credit, as is most common, is usually accomplished
by transferring the instrument to a bank for collection." Building
upon the American Bankers Association Bank Collection Code, the
draft of a proposed Uniform Bank Collections Act which had not
been adopted by any state legislature, the numerous clearing house
constitutions, rules and regulations as well as Regulations G and
J of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and
the largely uniform "operating letters" of the Federal Reserve
banks, the draftsman developed article 4 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, 6 probably the most controversial article of the
entire Code.2 7 One of the draftsmen of article 4 explained the
general approach adopted in the following terms: 8
".. . The movement of perhaps 25,000,000 items through bank
channels every business day was a volume operations of tre-
mendous proportions. Such operation was primarily mechan-
ical and the rules governing it similarly should be largely
mechanical. Rules laid down would probably be of more
value if they gave quick, clear-cut answers to the customers
and banks interested in the collection of items than if they
stated broad general principles from which courts or lawyers
could reason their way to a result. An examination of the
actual existing rules as they have developed in the last fifty
24 See W. VA. CODE, ch. 31, art. 4A, § 3 (Michie 1961) revised by Acts
of 1949, ch. 21. "Deferred posting" is the process whereby a drawee or
payor bank sorts and proves items received on the day of receipt, but does
not post the items to the customers account or return "not good" items
until the next day. See Malcolm, op. cit. supra note 19, at 269. The practice
was made necessary by the practical impossibility of having sufficient per-
sonnel, at the increased wage rates of World War II era, to process the
greatly increased number of items completely on the day of receipt. See
Leary, Article 4: Bank Deposits And Collections Under The Uniform Com-
mercial Code, 15 U. Prrr. L. REv. 565, 567 (1954).
25 See Leary, op. cit. supra note 24, at 565-66.
26 See Leary, op. cit. supra note 24, at 567.
27 See Beutel, The Proposed Uniform [P] Code Should Not Be Adopted,
61 YAI.E L.J. 334, 357-60 (1952), attacking Article 4 for one-sided draftsman-
ship to protect the banks at the expense of the customer-depositor.
28 Malcolm, op. cit. supra note 19, at 270.
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years in Federal Reserve operating letters, in clearing house
rules and in state statutes . . ., indicates a marked trend
toward such mechanical rules. The Code should follow this
trend."
The following three common factors were kept in mind by
the draftsmen: (1) Federal Reserve statistics indicated 990 per-
cent of all collection items are promptly paid when presented, such
good items being 99% percent of the dollar volume involved, with
one-half of the bad checks being paid when presented the sec-
ond time, making the area of risk one-eighth of one percent of
dollar volume; and (2) the costs of collection should be kept at a
minimum to encourage banks to continue to maintain low service
charges; and (3) concern over a possible one-eighth of one per-
cent loss situation should not require the imposition of safeguards,
priorities and statutory rules upon all items, if the effect of such
legal rules will be to increase the cost of handling for the 99%
percent of the good items, with this third factor, rather than any
sell-out to the banks, being the cause for the elimination of sev-
eral provisions of earlier drafts that at first blush appeared fair
and reasonable.29
Based on the foregoing approach and common factors, the
following interest-weighing principles of bank collection law were
adopted and observed in the drafting: (1) the rules of law must
not require procedures that, in the interest of increasing the per-
centage of good items above 99% percent, will impose greater costs
upon all items, resulting in increased costs of doing business and
increased service charges; (2) the rules must be flexible enough to
permit the myriad of possible cases to be efficiently and promptly
handled and to permit the collection system to develop and take
advantage of new methods and new procedures not presently
envisaged, consequently there should be as few rules prescribing
detailed mechanics as possible; and (3) the credit risk in taking
a check should be reduced to the minimum by requiring speed
in the collection process to permit a fast conversion of the check
into a final credit on the books of the depositary bank.3"
Article 4 is divided into five main parts. Part 1, General Pro-
visions and Definitions, consists of rules of construction and a
number of definitions, with definitions from other articles incorpo-
29 See Leary, op. cit. supra note 24, at 579-80.
30 See Leary, op. cit. supra note 24, at 570.
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rated by reference. Part 2, Collections of Items: Depositary and
Collecting Banks, sets forth rules relating to the handling of items
by collecting and payor banks and the means of settling items.
Part 3, Collection of Items: Payor Banks, relates to duties and
liabilties of payor banks. Part 4, Relationship Between Payor Bank
and its Customer, deals with rights and duties of the payor bank
with respect to the handling of checks and other items drawn by
its deposit customer. And Part 5, Collection of Documentary Drafts,
concerns the rights and duties of banks handling, for collection and
payment, drafts with documents (such as bills of lading and ware-
house receipts) attached.
Because the article's definition of the more common terms will
be used in discussing changes in West Virginia law which will
be effected if the Commercial Code be adopted, those definitions
are set forth verbatim.
Section 4-104(1) provides:
"(a) "Accounf' means any account with a bank and includes
a checking, time, interest or savings account;
(b) "Afternoon" means the period of a day between noon
and midnight;
(c) "Banking day" means that part of any day on which a
bank is open to the public for carrying on substantially
all of its banking functions;
(d) "Clearing house" means any association of banks or other
payors regularly clearing items;
(e) "Customer" means any person having an account with a
bank or for whom a bank has agreed to collect items and
includes a bank carrying an account with another bank;
(f) "Documentary draft" means any negotiable or nonnego-
tiable draft with accompanying documents, securities or
other papers to be delivered against honor of the draft;
(g) "Item" means any instrument for the payment of money
even though it is not negotiable but does not include
money;
(h) "Midnight deadline" with respect to a bank is midnight
on its next banking day following the banking day on
which it receives the relevant item or notice or from which
[ Vol. 64
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the time for taking action commences to run, whichever
is later;
(i) 'Troperly payable" includes the availability of funds for
payment at the time of decision to pay or dishonor;
(j) "Settle" means to pay in cash, by clearing house settle-
ment, in a charge or credit or by remittance, or othewise
as instructed. A settlement may be either provisional or
final;
(k) "Suspends payments" with respect to a bank means that
it has been closed by order of the supervisory authorities,
that a public officer has been appointed to take it over or
that it ceases or refuses to make payments in the ordinary
course of business."
Section 4-105 states:
"In this Article unless the context otherwise requires:
(a) "Depositary bank" means the first bank to which an item
is transferred for collection even thought it is also the
payor bank;
(b) 'Tayor bank" means a bank by which an item is payable
as drawn or accepted;
(c) "Intermediary bank" means any bank to which an item
is transferred in course of collection except the depositary
or payor bank;
(d) "Collecting bank" means any bank handling the item for
collection except the payor bank;
(e) 'Tresenting bank" means any bank presenting an item
except a payor bank;
(f) "Remitting bank" means any payor or intermediary bank
remitting for an item."
Som CniNGEs Emcrn= BY AmTCL 4
There are many technical rules set forth in article 4 relating
to the complex of rights and duties between banks and in the col-
lection process which will not be discussed herein as they are of
interest only to those lawyers counseling banks in such matters.
For such lawyers, there is available much excellent source material
1962 ]
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for a detailed and extensive examination of the inter-bank pro-
visions of the article. The Joint Committee on Continuing Legal
Education of the American Law Institute and the American Bar
Association has published an excellent monograph"1 in paper back
form on article 4, written by some of the draftsmen in the easy-
to-read style featured in the Joint Committee's publications, which
gives a detailed, integrated explanation of the more important
provisions of the article. In addition there are several law review
pieces 2 on article 4, giving valuable insights into the complex
factual problems faced by the draftsmen and the approaches
adopted for their solution as well as providing a detailed discus-
sion of how the article changes the decisional and statutory law
of particular states. Care must be exercised in relying on the
earlier dated law review articles, however, for they fail to reflect
the important changes made in the Official Text of the Commer-
cial Code between 1951 and 1958. Finally, the comments to the
1958 Official Text are quite complete and extensive in scope, set-
ting forth prior uniform statutory provisions as well as presenting
a detailed discussion of the purposes of each section. For bank
attorneys interested in a section by section comparison of article 4
with the A.B.A. Bank Collection Code and the other customary
relevant statutes, a series of articles"3 in The Oregon Law Review
has performed this task. If article 4 should be adopted, bank
attorneys will find that all statutory materials now existing on
the subject of bank deposits and collections are covered therein
except for the present statutes dealing with deposits in trust and
3, See CLARK, BAILEY & YOUNG, BANK Dxposrrs AND COLLECTIONS UNDMx
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (Joint Committee On Continuing Legal
Education of the A.L.I. and A.B.A. 1959) [hereinafter cited CLAMK, BA.MEY &
YOUNG].
32 See Beutel, The Proposed Uniform [?] Code Should Not Be Adopted,
61 YALE; L.J. 334 (1952); Brome, Bank Deposits and Collections, 16 LAw &
CoNrsmr. PROB. 308 (1951); Brown, Bank Deposits and Collections, 48 Ky.
L.J. 232 (1960); Gilmore, The Uniform Commercial Code: A Reply To
Professor Beutel, 61 YALE L.J. 364 (1952); Griffiths, Report on Article 4
of the Uniform Commercial Code Entitled "Bank Deposits and Collections,"
15 Omo ST.. L.J. 24 (1954); Leary Article 4: Bank Deposits and Collections
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 15 U. Prrr. L. RPv. 565 (1954); Love,
How the Adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code Would Affect the Law
of Bank Deposits and Collections in Oregon, 32 ORE. L. REv. 25, 156, 288
(1952); Malcolm, Article 4-A Battle With Complexity, 1952 Wis. L. REV.
265; Vergari, In Re Articles 3, 4 and 5, 28 Tzn,. L.Q. 528, 538 (1955);
Wertz, Article 4: Bank Deposits and Collections, 21 MoNr. L. REv. 42
(1959); Wilson, How the Adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code Would
Affect the Law of Bank Deposits and Collections in Oregon, 30 Opx. L. Rv.
359 (1951).
33 See Wilson, op. cit. supra note 32 and Love, op. cit. supra note 32.
[ Vol. 64664
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joint bank accounts,34 payments of deposits to minors,3" and ad-
verse claims to bank credits.36 Another drafting technique helpful
to the bank attorney is the decision to place in article 4 much
material formerly found only in the Negotiable Instruments Law
which now appears in revised form as article 3. Furthermore, the
negotiable instrument provisions of article 4 govern, for purposes
of applying article 4, in the event of a conflict with Article 3."
The discussion of article 4 which follows is directed to the
practicing attorney, not primarily concerned with counseling banks,
who has day-to-day problems in the area of article 4 dealing with
aspects of the depositor-bank relationship. Some of the problems
most commonly encountered with respect to that relationship in-
volve such matters as variation of applicable law by private agree-
ment, such as by legends on deposit slips in the banking field;
indorsements and warranties; time limitations upon withdrawal
of deposits; rules of priority for stop orders, attachments, etc., and
the order in which items are to be charged against a bank account;
when the bank may charge the customer's account; bank liability
for wrongful dishonor; stop payment orders; stale checks; death or
incompetence of the customer; customer's duty to discover and
report forgeries and alterations; and collection of documentary
drafts.
In the discussion which follows, reference to a section of the
Uniform Commercial Code will be indicated by using the same
numbering system as is used in the Official 1958 Edition, that is,
a four digit number with a dash separating the first and second
digits and with the first digit indicating the article and the second
digit indicating the particular part subdivision of the article. For
example, "secton 4-101" indicates subdivision 1 of Part 1 of Article
4. The phrase "ABA Code" will be used to refer to the Bank Col-
lection Code contained in West Virginia Code, chapter 31, article
4A (Michie 1961). Other West Virginia statutory material will
be referred to by using the word "Code" followed by the Arabic
numerals, separated by dashes, for the particular chapter, article
and section, e.g., Code 31-8-22 to refer to West Virginia Code,
chapter 31, article 8, section 22.
34 W. VA. CODE, ch. 31, art. 8, § 23 (Michie 1961).
35 W. VA. CODE, ch. 31, art. 8, § 24 (Michie 1961).36 W. VA. CODE, ch. 31, art. 8, § 28 (Michie 1961).
37 See U.C.C. § 4-102(1).
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1 Variations by Agreement
One of the major problems facing the draftsmen of article 4
concerned the extent to which freedom of contract should be pre-
served in the customer-bank relationship. For a long time prior to
the ABA Code, banks had been stating in legends on deposit slips
and other forms used in dealing with customers the terms upon
which an item would be received for deposit or collection, a prac-
tice not uniformly sustained by case law."8 ABA Code, section 2,
recognizes the right to vary by agreement the rules specified in
section 2 relating to collecting banks being agents and sub-agents
for depositors and to withdrawal of revocable credits. Heeding
complaints that earlier drafts specifying in detail the rules variable
by agreement would place the banks in a strait jacket and desiring
to adopt flexibility as a standard to deal with the complexity of
the subject and realizing that practices would certainly change, 9
the draftsmen settled on the following provisions of UCC section
4-103:
Section 4-103. Variation by Agreement; Measure of Dam-
ages; Certain Action Constituting Ordinary
Care.
"(1) The effect of the provisions of this Article may be
varied by agreement except that no agreement can disclaim
a bank's responsibility for its own lack of good faith or failure
to exercise ordinary care or can limit the measure of damages
for such lack or failure; but the parties may by agreement deter-
mine the standards by which such responsibility is to be
measured if such standards are not manifestly unreasonable.
(2) Federal Reserve regulations and operating letters,
clearing house rules, and the like, have the effect of agree-
ments under subsection (1), whether or not specifically as-
sented to by all parties interested in items handled.
(3) Action or non-action approved by this Article or pur-
suant to Federal Reserve regulations or operating letters con-
stitutes the exercise of ordinary care and, in the absence of
special instructions, action or non-action consistent with clear-
ing house rules and the like or with a general banking usage
38 See Malcolm, op. cit. supra note 19, at 266.
39 See Malcolm, op. cit. supra note 19, at 274-79; Vergari, op. cit. supra
note 19, at 539-40; CLAr, BA= & YOUNG 27-29.
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not disapproved by this Article, prima facie constitutes the
exercise of ordinary care.
(4) The specification or approval of certain procedures by
this Article does not constitute disapproval of other procedures
which may be reasonable under the circumstances.
(5) The measure of damages for failure to exercise ordinary
care in handling an item is the amount of the item reduced
by an amount which could not have been realized by the use
of ordinary care, and where there is bad faith it includes other
damages, if any, suffered by the party as a proximate conse-
quence.
Note that all that may not be changed by agreement is the
measure of damages and the bank's responsibility for its own lack
of good faith and failure to exercise ordinary care. "Good faith"
is defined in subsection 1-201(19) as "honesty in fact in the
conduct or transaction concerned," a definition taken from the
uniform acts on sales, warehouse receipts, bills of lading, and stock
transfers, according to Comment 19 to that section. Subsection
4-103(2) penalizes the presence of "bad faith" by extending the
measure of damages beyond the amount of the item involved to
include other damages suffered as a proximate consequence of
the failure to exercise ordinary care. Comment 4 to section 4-103
points out that the term "ordinary care" is not defined, that no
attempt is made in article 4 to define in toto what constitutes
ordinary care or lack of it, and that the term is used in its normal
tort meaning and not in any special sense relating to bank collec-
tions. It should be noted, however, that subsection 4-103(3) spec-
ifies that conduct approved by article 4, Federal Reserve regula-
tions, or Federal Reserve bank operating letters is per se ordinary
care, while conduct consistent with clearing house rules and the
like or with general banking usage not disapproved by article 4
is prima facie ordinary care in the absence of special instructions."
The Comment 2 points out that the term "general banking usage"
means a general usage common to banks in the area concerned,
such as throughout a state, a substantial portion of a state, or a
metropolitan area, and requires a usage broader than a mere prac-
40 See Leary, op. cit. supra note 24, at 588, justifying the distinction made
between the effect of Federal Reserve regulations and operating letters, on
one hand, and clearing house rules, on the other, on the ground the former
had a quasi-governmental status.
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tice between two or three banks. An early West Virginia case"
refused to permit a local banking custom of the Charleston area
to vary the then generally accepted common law rule prohibiting
direct sending of an item to the payor bank, a practice now per-
mitted by Code 31-8-22 as well as by ABA Code, section 6. Also
to be noted is that the agreement may set private standards by
which the bank's responsibility for its own lack of good faith or
failure to exercise ordinary care provided those standards are not
manifestly unreasonable.
The private agreement to vary the provisions of article 4 as
permitted by subsection 4-103(1) will be binding only upon the
parties assenting thereto, whereas the variations by Federal Re-
serve regulations and operating letters, clearing house rules, and
the like, as permitted by subsection 4-103(2), will be binding upon
all parties interested in the item regardless of lack of assent. Com-
ment 2 states the distinction made with regard to assent was made
necessary by the fact that it would be impossible to obtain direct
agreement from all the parties interested in all items inasmuch
as banks now handled at least 25,000,000 items per day.
One author 2 does not believe the banks and their customers
will avail themselves of the privileges of subsection 4-103(1) to
any great extent since the rules of article 4 are so reasonably fair
and workable that banks and depositors will be delighted to have
them. It has been suggested the privilege be used by banks to
require the customer to give more specific information about a
check involved in a stop-order than is now required by section
4-403, covering stop-orders."3 It has been stated " that the fol-
lowing kinds of agreements would be permissible, within reason-
able limits, under subsection 4-103(1):
(a) An agreement between a group of banks permitting
the adoption of an earlier cut-off hour than the 2:00 P.M. hour
specified in section 4-107;
(b) An agreement extending times of collection, payment
or return of items, if within reasonable limits, as well as agree-
ments setting earlier time limits for action on items;
4, See Pinkney v. Kanawba Valley Bank, supra note 3.
42 See Malcolm, op. cit. supra note 19, at 278.
43 See Leary, op. cit. supra note 24, at 529.4 4 See CLARK, BAILEY & YouNG 43-44.
[ Vol. 64
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(c) An agreement relating to the mode of sending items
or the channels through which items are sent, e.g., use of
armored car service, air freight or air express, or direct send-
ing of an item by a depositary bank to a Federal Reserve bank
of another district in which the payor bank is situate;
(d) An agreement relating to protest of dishonored items
and the giving of notice of dishonor, by wire or other means;
(e) An agreement between a bank and its depositor relat-
ing to the time within which an item may be charged back or
the earliest period within which a depositor may draw on the
provisional credit given him upon deposit of an item for col-
lection;
(f) An agreement shortening the various periods set forth
in section 4-406 within which a customer may question his
bank statement.
It is believed" the following types of agreements would not be
permissible under subsection 4-103(1):
(a) An agreement between a bank and a customer excus-
ing the bank from liability for wrongful dishonor of a prop-
erly payable item drawn by the customer or limiting damages
for such wrongful dishonor;
(b) An agreement between a bank and a customer on a
stop-payment order excusing the bank from liability for in-
advertently paying the item against which the stop-order has
been placed.
2 Indorsements and Warranties
Under ABA Code, section 2, where an item is deposited or
received for collection, the bank of deposit is deemed the agent of
the depositor for collection and each subsequent collecting bank
is likewise deemed a sub-agent of the depositor for collection, with
any credit given by the agent or sub-agent being revocable until
the proceeds are received in actual money or an unconditional
cerdit is given for the item on the books of another bank which
is requested or accepted by the agent bank. Nevertheless, ABA
Code section 4 provides that where the deposited item is payable
to bearer or endorsed in blank or specially by the depositor, the
4 5 Id. at 44-45.
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subsequent holders (sub-agents) have a right to rely on the pre-
sumption that the bank of deposit is the owner of the item, but the
bank of deposit can negative the presumption of ownership, where
the deposited item is endorsed specially or in blank, by converting
the depositor's endorsement into a restrictive one, such as by writ-
ing over his signature the words "for deposit" or "for collection".
In addition ABA Code section 4 permits the bank of deposit to
negative the presumption of ownership in the case of items pay-
able to bearer by endorsing them "received for deposit or "re-
ceived for collection". In the view of the draftsmen of article 4,
it was unrealistic to base the rights and duties of all banks in the
collection chain on variations in the form of indorsements where
the large volume of checks handled made it impossible for all banks
to examine all indorsements and where in fact such an examina-
tion was never made, except perhaps by depositary banks." Ac-
cordingly, the general approach in article 4 is to provide rules or
answers for problems known to exist in the bank collection process
without regard to questions of status and ownership but the general
principles of status and ownership should be kept available to
cover residual areas not covered by the specific rules.4"
The article 4 solution, subsection 4-201(1), reads:
(1) Unless a contrary intent clearly appears and prior to
the time that a settlement given by a collecting bank for an
item is or becomes final (subsection (3) of Section 4-211 and
Sections 4-212 and 4-213) the bank is an agent or sub-agent
of the owner of the item and any settlement given for the
item is provisional. This provision applies regardless of the
form of indorsement or lack of indorsement and even though
credit given for the item is subject to immediate withdrawal
as of right or is in fact withdrawn; but the continuance of
ownership of an item by its owner and any rights of the owner
to proceeds of the item are subject to rights of a collecting
bank such as those resulting from outstanding advances on
the item and valid rights of setoff. When an item is handled
by banks for purposes of presentment, payment and collection,
the relevant provisions of this Article apply even though action
of parties clearly establishes that a particular bank has pur-
chased the item and is the owner of it.
46 Comment 6 to U.C.C. § 4-201.
47 Comment 1 to U.C.C. § 4-201.
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It is clear that as between the customer and his depositary
bank, the customer remains the owner of the item (until final set-
tlement is made), for purposes of attachment by his creditors, his
own insolvency or the insolvency of the depositary bank,48 risk
of loss, and computation of the dollar limitations of Federal De-
posit Insurance. 9 Although subsection 4-201(1) makes it plain
that the form of indorsement used by the customer will no longer
be determinative of status, a clearly expressed contrary intent is
permittted to negative the presumption of agency. Comment 2
suggests that an example of a clear contrary intent would arise
where collateral papers established, or the item bore a legend
stating, that the item was sold absolutely to the depositary bank.
Although the form of the customer's indorsement to the depositary
bank will not be determinative of status, a restrictive indorsement,
such as "for deposit" or "for collection", will still protect the cus-
tomer against further negotiation of the item to a holder in due
course by a finder or a thief.50
In the interests of speeding up collections by eliminating any
necessity to return to a non-bank depositor any items he may have
failed to indorse, subsection 4-205(1) permits a depositary bank
to supply any customer's indorsement "necessary to title" unless the
item contained the words "payee's indorsement required" or sim-
ilar language; and, in the event the payee's indorsement is not
specifically required, a depositary bank's statement on the item
that it was deposited by a customer or credited to his account
would be effective as the customer's indorsement. The ABA Code
contains no like provision, but the procedure is in accord with
accepted bank practice which has been sustained by case law."
With respect to warranties, the ABA Code, section 4 provides
that the indorsement "pay any bank or banker" constitutes a guar-
anty by the indorser to all subsequent holders and to the drawee
or payer of the genuineness of and authority to make prior indorse-
ments and also to save the drawee or payor harmless in the event
any prior indorsement is defective or irregular, unless such liabil-
48 See U.C.C. § 214(1) entitling the customer to return of the item if
the collecting bank suspends payment and the item is not finally paid. The
rules of preference of article 4 generally follow those of the ABA Code except
that the trust theory is abandoned. See Comment 2 to U.C.C. § 214.
49 See Comment 4 to U.C.C. § 201.
-o See Comment 2to U.C.C. § 4-205.
51 See CLrmux, BA=LY & YOUNG 58-59. See Zinn v. Kittle, 20 F. Supp.
557 (N.D. W.Va. 1937), for an example of loss caused by payor bank having
to return a check improperly indorsed by payee law partnership.
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ity is disclaimed by appropriate words coupled with the indorse-
ment. For all other matters respecting warranties in the customer-
depositor relationship and the bank collection process in ABA Code
states, resort must be had to the Negotiable Instrument Law, sec-
tion 65 and 66.52 The warranties in article 4 are contained in
section 4-207 and, except for certain changes peculiar to the bank
collection process and the fact they apply only to customers and
collecting banks, they are identical in substance with the war-
ranties provided in article 3, Commercial Paper, sections 3-414
and 3-417." The section provides as follows:
Section 4-207. Warranties of Customer and Collecting Bank
on Transfer or Presentment of Items; Time
for Claims.
"(1) Each customer or collecting bank who obtains pay-
ment or acceptance of an item and each prior customer and
collecting bank warrants to the payor bank or other payor who
in good faith pays or accepts the item that.
(a) he has a good title to the item or is authorized to obtain
payment or acceptance on behalf of one who has a good
title; and
(b) he has no knowledge that the signature of the maker or
drawer is unauthorized, except that this warranty is not
given by any customer or collecting bank that is a holder
in due course and acts in good faith
(i) to a maker with respect to the maker's own signa-
ture; or
(ii) to a drawer with respect to the drawer's own signa-
ture, whether or not the drawer is also the drawee;
or
(iii) to an acceptor of an item if the holder in due course
took the item after the acceptance or obtained the
acceptance without knowledge that the drawer's sig-
nature was unauthorized; and
(c) the item has not been materially altered, except that this
warranty is not given by any customer or collecting bank
that is a holder in due course and acts in good faith
52 W. VA. CoDE, ch. 46, art. 5, §§ 6 and 7 (Michie 1961).
53 See Comment 1 to U.C.C. § 4-207.
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(i) to the maker of a note; or
(ii) to the drawer of a draft whether or not the drawer
is also the drawee; or
(iii) to the acceptor of an item with respect to an altera-
tion made prior to the acceptance if the holder in
due course took the item after the acceptance, even
though the acceptance provided "payable as orginal-
ly drawn" or equivalent terms; or
(iv) to the acceptor of an item with respect to an altera-
tion made after the acceptance.
(2) Each customer and collecting bank who transfers an
item and receives a settlement or other consideration for it
warrants to his transferee and to any subsequent collecting
bank who takes the item in good faith that
(a) he has a good title to the item or is authorized to obtain
payment or acceptance on behalf of one who has a good
title and the transfer is otherwise rightful; and
(b) all signatures are genuine or authorized; and
(c) the item has not been materially altered; and
(d) no defense of any party is good against him; and
(e) he has no knowledge of any insolvency proceeding in-
stituted with respect to the maker or acceptor or the
drawer of an unaccepted item.
In addition each customer and collecting bank so transferring
an item and receiving a settlement or other consideration en-
gages that upon dishonor and any necessary notice of dishonor
and protest he will take up the item.
(3) The warranties and the engagement to honor set forth
in the two preceding subsections arise notwithstanding the ab-
sence of indorsement or words of guaranty or warranty in the
transfer or presentment and a collecting bank remains liable for
their breach despite remittance to its transferor. Damages for
breach of such warranties or engagement to honor shall not
exceed the consideration received by the customer or collect-
ing bank responsible plus finance charges and expenses related
to the item, if any.
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(4) Unless a claim for breach of warranty under this sec-
tion is made within a reasonable time after the person claim-
ing learns of the breach, the person liable is discharged to the
extent of any loss caused by the delay in making claim."
Subsection (1) of section 4-207 sets forth warranties that run
only to the payor while subsection (2) details the warranties that
run to the transferee and subsequent collecting banks who are not
the payor. Having decided to allow certain warranties to run to
the payor, in order to permit the payor to recover on a warranty
theory rather than on a "mistake of fact" theory or on a specific
guaranty of prior indorsements," it was necessary for the drafts-
men to segregate the warranties to the payor in a separate sub-
section in order to retain the rule of Price v. Neal with respect to
such warranties, that is that a payor which pays an item contain-
ing a forged drawer's signature cannot recover from the person
receiving payment. Section 3-417 of article 3, Commercial Paper,
makes a similar distinction. Other points to be noted about the
section which are peculiar to the bank collection process are the
following: (a) subsection 4-207(3) specifies that the warranties
run automatically without the necessity for an indorsement or words
of guaranty, thus obviating the need for the stamp presently used
reading "prior indorsements guaranteed"; (b) subsection 4-207(3)
also contains a limitation on damages recoverable for breach of
warranty; and (c) subsection 4-207(4), in conjunction with sec-
tion 4-406 (placing burden on maker whose account is charged
to notify the payor promptly of forgeries and alterations), pre-
vents a collecting bank from being contingently liable for a period
as long as the period of the statute of limitations."5 For a detailed
discussion of the purpose and effect of these warranties, see the
article in this series on the Uniform Commercial Code dealing with
article 3, Commercial Paper.
3 TIME LIMITATIONS UPON WITHDRAWAL OF DEPOSITS
It has long been the practice in bank collections that the
credit given a depositor initially upon receipt of an item for col-
lection is only provisional, subject to revocation and charge back
in the event final settlement for the item is not received by the
collecting bank upon a timely forwarding of the item for present-
ment. The collecting bank, and each intermediary bank in the
54 See CLRK, BAILEY & YOUNG 132.
55 Id at 143.
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chain of collection, receives only a provisional settlement or credit
from its transferee, with all these provisional credits firming up
into final settlements if the payor honors the item and remits in
an acceptable medium.56 ABA Code, section 2, states that the
credit given by the collecting bank and subsequent banks upon
receipt of an item for collecting is revocable until final settlement
is received in money or a requested or accepted bank credit. ABA
Code, section 3, provides that the credit given a depositor upon
the day of receipt is only provisional where the deposit consists
of a demand item payable at, by or through the depositary bank,
that bank being given until midnight of the next business day to
dishonor or refuse payment. This practice of provisional settlements
becoming final settlements upon final payment (and converting the
depositary bank from an agent to a debtor) is codified in great
detail in various sections of article 4, e.g., sections 4-211, 4-212 and
4-213, which affect the customer's privilege of making a with-
drawal as of right against a deposited item. Subject to the bank's
right to apply the credit against an obligation of the customer,
withdrawal as of right against the credit for a deposited item
arises at the opening of the next banking day with respect to a
cash deposit,57 and at the opening of the second banking day with
respect to an item drawn or made by another customer of the
same depositary bank (in which case the bank is also prayor)
provided the item is good, i.e., posted to the customer-drawer's ac-
count.5 8 As respects any other type deposit, withdrawal as of right
against the credit arises only after the provisional settlement re-
ceived by the depositary bank from its immediate transferee is
firmed into a final settlement and the depositary bank has had a
reasonable time to learn of such final settlement." In the event
final settlement is not made with the depositary bank, due to dis-
honor or otherwise, it has the right to revoke the customer's pro-
visional settlement, charge back the credit given his account or
obtain a refund.6" If the depositary bank is also the payor, how-
ever, it becomes accountable for the amount of a demand item de-
posited unless it pays or returns the item or sends notice of dishonor
before its "midnight deadline" (midnight of next banking day
after receipt)."6 Likewise a collecting bank must take proper ac-
56 Id at 1-5..57 U .C .C . 4 4- 13 I)5 8 
U.C.C. § 4-213 (4) (b).
59U.C.C. § 4-213(4) (a).
6U.CC. § 4-212(1).
61 U.C.C. § 4-302(a). "Deferred posting," now permitted by ABA Code,
section 4, is incorporated into Article 4 in § 4-301.
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tion before its "midnight deadline" in order to act seasonably with
respect to an item; otherwise, it has the burden of proving that
proper action taken within a reasonably longer time is seasonable.2
4 Rules of Priority for Stop-Orders, Attachments, Etc.; Order
for Charging Items Against Account
Section 4-303. When Items Subject to Notice, Stop-Order,
Legal Process or Setoff; Order in Which Items
May Be Charged or Certified.
(1) Any knowledge, notice or stop-order received by, legal
process served upon or setoff exercised by a payor bank,
whether or not effective under other rules of law to terminate,
suspend or modify the bank's right or duty to pay an item or
to charge its customer's account for the item, comes too late to
so terminate, suspend or modify such right or duty if the
knowledge, notice, stop-order or legal process is received or
served and a reasonable time for the bank to act thereon ex-
pires or the setoff is exercised after the bank has done any of
the following:
(a) accepted or certified the item;
(b) paid the item in cash;
(c) settled for the item without reserving a right to revoke
the settlement and without having such right under statute,
clearing house rule or agreement;
(d) completed the process of posting the item to the indicated
account of the drawer, maker or other person to be
charged therewith or otherwise has evidenced by exam-
ination of such indicated account and by action its deci-
sion to pay the item; or
(e) become accountable for the amount of the item under
subsection (1) (d) of Section 4-213 and Section 4-302
dealing with the payor bank's responsibility for late re-
turn of items.
(2) Subject to the provisions of subsection (1) items may
be accepted, paid, certified or charged to the indicated account
of its customer in any order convenient to the bank.
62 U.C.C. § 4-202(2).
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There is no provision in the ABA Code respecting the subject
matter of section 4-303. Note that the knowledge, notice, stop-
order, etc., comes too late if "received or served and a reasonable
time for the bank to act thereon expires" before the bank has done
any of the things enumerated in subsection 4-303(1). This con-
cept of "reasonable time to act thereon" may modify Code
31-8-28, dealing with adverse claims against bank credits and
fiduciary accounts. Code 31-8-28 requires the bank to hold the
funds "on... delivery of" the bond therein specified and permits
the bank to freeze the fiduciary account "upon receipt by it" of an
affidavit of the adverse claimant. Code 31-8-28 would survive
adoption of article 4 which has no provisions respecting procedure
for adverse claims other than the priority rules of section 4-303.
At first glance the language in subsection 4-403 (1) (d) stating
"or otherwise has evidenced by examination of such indicated ac-
count and by action its decision to pay the item" seems ambigu-
ous. The Comment points out, however, that it is intended to be
an omnibus clause to pick up other types of action impossible to
specify particularly but where the bank has examined the account
to see if there are sufficient funds and has taken some action in-
dicating an intention to pay. An example given by the Comment
is the procedure of "sight posting" whereby the bookkeeper ex-
amines the account and makes a decision to pay but postpones
posting to the account. According to the Comment, the language
is not intended to apply to other preliminary acts not indicating
a decision to pay, such as receiving the item over the counter for
collection, or entering a provisional credit in a passbook, or making
a provisional settlement through the clearing house.
Subsection 4-303(2) permits the bank to suit its own conven-
ience in determining the order in which several items on hand at
one time are to be accepted, paid, certified or charged to the cus-
tomer's account. The Comment states the adopted rule is justified
by the impossiblity of stating a rule otherwise uniformly fair and
by the application of the principle of estoppel against the drawer
who created the difficulty. In addition, the Comment would fol-
low the bank to give preference to items upon which it is liable
in fixing the order for charging items against the customer's ac-
count. The ABA Code contains no provisions respecting the sub-
ject matter of section 4-303 and no West Virginia case was found
which deals with section 4-403 matters.
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5 When Bank May Charge Customer's Account
Section 4-401. When Bank May Charge Customer's Account.
(1) As against its customer, a bank may charge against
his account any item which is otherwise properly payable
from that account even though the charge creates an overdraft.
(2) A bank which in good faith makes payment to a holder
may charge the indicated account of its customer according to
(a) the original tenor of his altered item; or
(b) the tenor of his completed item, even though the bank
knows the item has been completed unless the bank has
notice that the completion was improper.
The purpose and practicality of subsection 4-401(1) has been
explained by one of the draftsmen as follows:63
".. . This does not repeal any law prohibiting the doing of
business on overdraft, or the certification of checks against
uncollected funds. It merely prevents a claim by a customer
that overdrawing his account should operate as a stop order."
The same draftsman justfies the provisions of subsection 4-
401(2) in the following language:"'
"This [subsection 4-401(2)] . . . gives us an illustration of
the application of our first principle, that rules of protection
for the few bad items should not render it substantially more
costly to process the great bulk of good items. The average
bookkeeper must process about 2,600 items a day. You can-
not expect, in the first instance, such a work load to permit
so detailed an examination of a check to determine whether an
item has been completed in a different handwriting, or upon
a different typewriter, even though at a later date, in a court-
room, with the aid of enlarged photographs, a jury might find
the difference to be "obvious." In the eight seconds alloted
per item, the average bookkeeper has enough to do, even with
mechanized equipment. No person would be willing to pay
the resultant service charges if the rules of law compelled the
banks to hire bookkeepers capable of exercising judgment and
discrimination in matters of this sort and slowed operations to
63 Leary, op. cit. supra note 24, at 573.4 Ibid.
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the extent necessary to provide sufficient time. Furthermore,
the known loyalty and honesty of the very vast majority of
agents entrusted with filling out checks also compels the vote
of confidence given fiduciaries in general throughout the Code."
The Comment points out that subsection 4-401(2) follows the
policy of sections 3-115 and 3-407 (c) of article 3, Commercial
Paper. Reference should be made to the article in this series de-
voted to Article 3 where the matter is discussed in detail. It is
possible that subsection 4-401(2) might change the result of Hays
v. Lowndes Say. Bank & Trust Co.,"5 where the bank was held
liable in paying a fictitious payee without requiring proper identi-
fication in a case where the customer signed a check in blank with
instructions to his secretary to fill in a designated amount and a
designated payee. The ABA Code is silent with respect to the
rights of a bank to charge a customer's account.
6 Bank Liability for Dishonor
Section 4-402. Bank's Liability to Customer for Wrongful
Dishonor.
A payor bank is liable to its customer for damages proximate-
ly caused by the wrongful dishonor of an item. When the
dishonor occurs through mistake liability is limited to actual
damages proved. If so proximately caused and proved damages
may include damages for an arrest or prosecution of the cus-
tomer or other consequential damages. Whether any conse-
quential damages are proximately caused by the wrongful dis-
honor is a question of fact to be determined in each case.
Existing West Virginia law on the subject is found in Code 3-8-
21, which is relevant part reads:
"No banking institution shall be liable to a depositor because
of the nonpayment through mistake or error and without malice
of a check which should have been paid, unless the depositor
shall allege and prove actual damages by reason of such non-
payment, and in such event the liability shall not exceed the
actual damages so proved."
No West Virginia cases were found involving the subject matter
of section 4-402 and Code 31-8-21.
65 118 W. Va. 360, 190 S.E. 543 (1937).
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Comment 2 states out that the section does not attempt to
specify a theory upon which the bank's liability is based, pointing
out that the liability may be based either upon breach of contract,
negligence or defamation. According to Comment 3, the section
"rejects decisions which have held that where the dishonored item
has been drawn by a merchant, trader or fiduciary he is defamed
in his business, trade or profession by a reflection on his credit
and hence that substantial damages may be awarded on the basis
of defamation 'per se' without proof that damage has occured."
The wording of Code 31-8-21 presently reaches the same result.
Comment 5 indicates that the fourth sentence of the section is in-
tended to reject decisions holding that the dishonor of a check is
not the proximate cause of the arrest and prosecution of the drawer,
and leaves to a determination in each case as a question of fact
whether the dishonor is or may be the "proximate cause."
It should be noted, as indicated in Comment 4, that "wrongful
dishonor" is to be distinguished from "failure to exercise ordinary
care in handling an item" with respect to the applicable measure
of damages. The measure of damages for "wrongful dishonor" is
as stated in this section 4-402, whereas subsection 4-103(5) speci-
fies that the measure of damages for "failure to exercise ordinary
care in handling an item" is the amount of the item reduced by an
amount which could not have been realized by the use of ordinary
care, plus consequential damages if bad faith exists.
7 Stop-Payment Orders
Section 4-403. Customer's Right to Stop Payment; Burden of
Proof of Loss.
(1) A customer may by order to his bank stop payment of
any item payable for his account but the order must be received
at such time and in such manner as to afford the bank a rea-
sonable opportunity to act on it prior to any action by the bank
with respect to the item described in Section 4-303.
(2) An oral order is binding upon the bank only for four-
teen calendar days unless confirmed in writing within that
period. A written order is effective for only six months unless
renewed in writing.
(3) The burden of establishing the fact and amount of
loss resulting from the payment of an item contrary to a bind-
ing stop payment order is on the customer.
[ Vol. 64
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Code 31-8-26 provides as follows:
"No revocation, countermand or stop-payment order relat-
ing to the payment of any check or draft drawn on any bank-
ing institution doing business in this State, including national
banking associations, shall remain in effect for more than six
months after the service thereof on such banking institution,
unless the same be renewed, which renewal shall be in writ-
ing and be in effect for not more than ninety days from the
date of service thereof on such banking institution, after which
time such check or draft may be paid by such banking insti-
tution.
Service of the notice herein provided for may be made upon
any employee of such bank or trust company who may be
found at its place of business."
Section 4-403 differs from Code 31-8-26 in the following material
respects:
(a) Section 4-403 does not limit the right to stop payment to
checks and drafts, as does Code 31-8-26, but extends the right to
any item payable by any bank, such as a note payable at a bank.
See Comment 4.
(b) Section 4-403 permits an oral stop payment order but
limits its effectiveness to 14 days. Code 31-8-26 makes no explicit
provision permitting oral orders, but the use of the phrase "after
service thereof on such banking institution" would seem to require
a writing to be served. In this connection, Comment 6 points out
there are decisions holding that a bank has waived the statutory
requirement of a writing by accepting oral stop-payment orders.
(c) Comment 3 points out that subsection 4-403(1) is so
worded to follow the decisions holding that a payee or indorsee
has no right to stop payment. Code 31-8-26 is not clear on the
matter.
(d) Code 4-403 presumably permits the written renewal to
be effective for an additional six months as a second stop-payment
order." Code 31-8-26 likewise requires the renewal be in writing
but limits its effectiveness to an additional ninety days.
(e) Subsection 4-403(1) specifies the order "must be received
at such time and in such manner as to afford the bank a reason-
66See Leary, op. cit. supra note 24, at 580.
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able opportunity to act on it prior to any action by the bank with
respect to the item described in section 4-303" (specifying when the
bank has taken steps indicating a decision to pay the item after
which a stop-order comes too late). Code 31-8-26 permits service
upon any employee of the bank who may be found at its place of
business and allows no "reasonable opportunity to act upon it."
That the subsection 4-403(1) solution in this respect is preferable,
from the bank's viewpoint, to that of Code 31-8-26 is better re-
alized from a reading of the following general definition set forth
in subsection 1-201(27):
"Notice or notification received by an organization is effec-
tive for a particular transaction from the time when it is brought
to the attention of the individual conducting that transaction,
and in any event from the time when it would have been
brought to his attention if the organization had exercised due
diligence."
From the definition it would appear that a stop order is effective
only when it is brought to the attention of the individual responsible
for handling stop-orders or should in the exercise of due diligence
have been brought to his attention. Section 4-403 does not solve
all the problems, however, for it is believed that the bank cashier
receiving an oral stop order at home on Sunday must telephone
the bank early on Monday before banking hours or the bank will
be liable for cashing the stopped check before the cashier comes
to work on Monday.6"
(f) Code 31-8-26 contains no language making it clear that
the stop order must identify the item with particularity. Subsec-
tion 4-403(1) states that the order must be received "in such man-
ner" as to afford the bank a reasonable opportunity to act on it.
One commentator interprets the phrase "in such manner" to require
that the item be adequately identified by the stop order, citing
pre-Commercial Code cases holding the bank not liable for pay-
ment where the stop order omitted the check number or date or
used the wrong date or amount."8
(g) Code 31-8-26 is silent respecting burden of proof while
subsection 4-403(3) places the burden on the customer to establish
the fact and amount of loss resulting from payment contrary to a
binding stop payment order.
6 7 Id. at 579.68 Id. at 578.
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With respect to burden of proof as to the amount of loss re-
sulting from improper payment in disregard of binding stop-pay-
ment order, the question arises as to whether the bank has an
obligation to recredit the customer's account to avoid liability for
the dishonor of other items due to insufficient funds caused by the
payment contrary to the stop order. In the 1952 version of article
4, section 4-403, there was a Comment 9, omitted from the 1958
version, stating that the bank had no such obligation to recredit
the account until the customer had maintained the burden of proof
and was not liable for the dishonor of other items due to the in-
sufficiency of funds caused by the improper payment. One of the
draftsmen suggests the following solution to the problem: 9
".... It is one thing to determine whether an item has been
paid in disregard of a stop order. It is another thing to fix
the loss caused, including its amount, by such failure to ob-
serve a stop order. But, taken in conjunction with section
4-407, subrogating a bank which has made an improper pay-
ment to the rights of one entitled to the money, the provision
on burden of proof may have the following effect: If the bank
can establish that the payee was really owed the money, or
that the item was presented on behalf of a holder in due course,
then the customer cannot establish that he suffered any loss
by the payment, and cannot claim, further, that additional
checks were improperly dishonored causing further loss. On
the other hand, should the customer establish that as between
himself and the payee, he, the drawer, was entitled to the
money and that there is no holder in due course involved, then
it would seem to follow that he has suffered loss and the dis-
honor of the other items, caused by the improper debit, will be
an element of damages. To the extent that the Comment [Com-
ment 9 to 1952 version of section 4-403] can be taken to mean
that a bank which has charged an item to an account in dis-
regard of a valid stop order will not be liable for the dishonor
of items that would have otherwise been paid, the Comment
goes beyond the text and cannot control the text."
Inasmuch as Comment 9 has been omitted from the 1958 version of
article 4, section 4-403, it would appear that the analysis contained
in the foregoing quotation has been accepted as correct.
It is indicated in Comment 8, that the bank making improper
6
9 Id. at 581.
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payment in violation of an effective stop order, in addition to the
right of subrogation given by section 4-407 to prevent unjust in-
richment, retains common law defenses, e.g., that by conduct in
recognizing the payment the customer has ratified the bank's ac-
tion in paying over a stop payment order; and retains common law
rights, e.g., to recover money paid under a mistake in cases where
the payment is not made final by section 3-418.
It has been pointed out that the six months effective period of
a stop order might not afford complete protection to a bank if it
should, after expiration of the period and non-renewal of the
order, pay the check, since the check would then be stale and,
although case authority is divided, it might be questionable whether
the bank acted in good faith in making payment."0 In this connec-
tion, however, section 4-404 (relating to stale checks) specifically
states that a bank may charge its customer's account for a good
faith payment of a check presented more than six months after its
date. Morever, Comment 7 to section 4-403 states that sections
4-403(2) and 4-404 reject the reasoning of case law questioning
whether the bank could have acted in good faith in paying a then
stale check after the six month stop order had expired without
renewal.
Utilizing the right given by subsection 4-103(1) to vary the
provisions of article 4 by agreement, a bank, through legends on
deposit slips and the like, could avoid the trouble areas of stop
payment in section 4-403, e.g., verbal orders and inadequate identi-
fication of the item. Subsection 4-103(1), however does not permit
exculpatory clauses, so the bank could not by contract avoid the
duty to exercise ordinary care in stopping payment.
No West Virginia case was found construing Code 31-8-26
or dealing with stop payments.
8 Stale Checks
Section 4-404. Bank Not Obligated to Pay Check More Than
Six Months Old.
A bank is under no obligation to a customer having a check-
ing account to pay a check, other than a certified check, which
is presented more than six months after its date, but it may
charge its customer's account for a payment made thereafter
in good faith.
7oSee CLi, BAmEY & YOUNG 155.
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"Any banking institution in this State, including national
banking associations, may refuse to honor any check or draft
drawn on it, after the expiration of twelve months from the
date payable, or date of demand check or draft, unless, after
presentation thereof, it is directed by the drawer to pay the
same. No such banking institution shall incur any liability to
the drawer, holder or any other person, because of the refusal
to pay a check or draft, as authorized by this section."
Two major differences between section 4-404 and Code 31-8-27 are
apparent:
(a) In determining when a check becomes stale, section
4-404 uses a period of six months wheras Code 31-8-27 employs a
period of twelve months. The Comment states the period of six
months reflects current banking and commercial practice. Inas-
much as the provisions of Code 31-8-27 have not been substantially
modified since enactment in 1923, the twelve month period prob-
ably reflects the banking practice of that era.
(b) Section 4-404 affirmatively provides that the bank may
charge the customer's account for a good faith payment of a check
presented more than six months after its date whereas Code 31-8-27
is silent in this respect except in so far as the use of the phrase "may
refuse to honor" indicates that payment of the twelve month old
item is permissive. It is important that the bank be given the option
to pay stale checks ,because it is often in the position to know that
the drawer desires that payment be made, e.g., dividend checks.
See Comment to section 4-404.
In addition it should be noted that section 4-404 expressly
excludes certified checks. The exclusion is justified by the Com-
ment because upon certification the check becomes the primary
obligation of the certifying bank," running direct to the holder of
the check, and the customer's account has then been charged. Code
31-8-27 does not expressly state that certified .checks are not within
its scope, but such a result could be inferred from the language
which requires the bank to honor the stale check, upou presentment,
if directed to do so by the drawer. As has been pointed out, the
drawer's account was charged upon certification, thus he should no
71 See U.C.C. §§ 3-411, 3-413. See also W. VA. CODE, ch. 46, art. 16,
§ 5 (Michie 1961).
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longer have any control over the certified check, the bank's pri-
mary obligation, so as to direct that it be paid. In the only case
found in West Virginia touching upon stale certified checks, the
principles of the negotiable Instrument Law, rather than Code
31-8-27, were used to find that (1) the statute of limitations oper-
ates against a holder of a certified check from the date of certifica-
tion and (2) the holder is not deemed a holder in due course where
the certified check is negotiated an unreasonable length of time
after certification."2 In deciding the second point, however, the
court did refer to Code 31-8-27 as an indication of legislative intent
respecting the period of time deemed unreasonable."'
9 Death or Incompetence of Customer
Section 4-405. Death or Incompetence of Customer.
(1) A payor or collecting bank's authority to accept, pay
or collect an item or to account for proceeds of its collection
if otherwise effective is not rendered ineffective by incom-
petence of a customer of either bank existing at the time the
item is issued or its collection is undertaken if the bank does
not know of an adjudication of incompetence. Neither death
not incompetence of a customer revokes such authority to
accept, pay, collect or account until the bank knows of the
fact of death or of an adjudication of incompetence and has
reasonable opportunity to act on it.
(2) Even with knowledge a bank may for ten days after
the date of death pay or certify checks drawn on or prior to
that date unless ordered to stop payment by a person claiming
an interest in the account.
There is no express statutory provision in West Virginia with
respect to the effect of death or incompetency of the bank cus-
tomer except for Code 31-8-24 which permits the bank to make a
valid payment of his deposit to a minor customer unless directed
otherwise in writing by the parent or guardian. According to the
general rule, with exceptions where the check operates as an as-
signment and in the case of fiduciary, the death of the drawer of
a check revokes the authority of the drawee bank to pay it, and
the money becomes the property of the drawer's estate, payable to
his personal representative, and may be recovered from the payee
72 Weaver v. Harrell, 115 W. Va. 409, 176 S.E. 608 (1934).
7
3 Id. at 414, 173 S.E. at 610.
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to whom the bank has paid it, or from the bank itself, except where
the bank has paid without notice of the death. 4 Where the drawer
of a check becomes insane, the bank is generally protected in pay-
ment unless it has actual notice, but one case held the bank liable
for payment made after the drawer had been adjudicated insane
even though the bank was unaware of the adjudication which had
occurred in another state./
No West Virginia cases have been found respecting this prob-
lem, but it is common bank practice in West Virginia to check the
local daily death notices and adjudications of incompetency and
freeze the accounts of persons dying or adjudicated incompetent.
Subsection 4-405(1) makes it clear that the bank's authority
continues until the bank knows of the fact of death or adjudication
of incompetence and has reasonable opportunity to act on it.
The ten-days-after-death rule of subsection 4-405(2) is modeled
after statutes existing in seven states."6 The provisions of the rule
and the reasons for its adoption into article 4 have been explained
by one of the draftsmen as follows:
77
"There are several points to be noted here. The permission
to pay or certify is limited to checks, and does not extend to
items generally. Action may only be taken upon checks for
ten days after the date of death, not after the date of the
bank's receipt of knowledge of death. Payment may be stop-
ped by any person claiming an interest in the account, and
this may be for all checks or only as to particular items, since
the power to stop all obviously includes the power to stop less
than all. The interest may be fictitious or real; it is the claim
that is sufficient. Tax authorities could claim an interest and
order payment stopped. In accordance with the decisions
under the parent statutes, the Comment [Comment 3] states
that the statute merely protects the bank in making payments,
it does not affect the right of the personal representative of the
decedent to recover any improper payment, or affe.ct. the law
of gifts. The basis of the rule is, again, the convenience of
the great bulk of good transactions. Most people die solvent,
7 6ZOLLMAN , B.4xsS AND BANING, § 3791 (1936).
7 5 Id. § 3793.
76 See Leary, Article 4: Bank Deposits And Collections Under The Uni-
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and most of their outstanding checks represent debts that must
be paid, or allowances to children for living expenses that
should be disbursed. The occasional check obtained by the
beautiful blonde nurse during the last illness by devious de-
vices that enlivened the discussion of this section during the
drafting sessions is not a sufficient risk to outweigh the bene-
fits. In most areas, the bank can police the exercise of this
privilege through an officer, who will, probably refrain from
paying sizeable checks, or unusual checks. In large metro-
politan centers, banks may decide not to avail themselves of
the privilege. But if used, the section should save the servant,
wage earner, the grocer, baker, butcher and other service
trades the nuisance of receiving a returned check and asking
the executors to make good. The section does not, of course,
solve the problem of how to meet the payroll of an individually
owned business that falls due the day after a death known to
a bank. Clearly all agencies to draw checks are revoked by
death, and the bank's authority is gone because it knows of
the death and, perforce, the checks must be drawn after death,
so the provisions of section 4-405(2) do not give any comfort.
The situation remains as it was before the Code, as perhaps
it should, for it is clearly dangerous to permit the general
drawing of checks after death. .. ."
10 Bank Customer's Duty To Discover and Report Forgeries
and Alterations
Section 4-406. Customer's Duty to Discover and Report Un-
authorized Signature or Alteration.
(1) When a bank sends to its customer a statement of ac-
count accompanied by items paid in good faith in support of
the debit entries or holds the statement and items pursuant
to a request or instructions of its customer or otherwise in a
reasonable manner makes the statement and items available to
the customer, the customer must exercise reasonable care and
promptness to examine the statement and items to discover
his unauthorized signature or any alteration on an item and
must notify the bank promptly after discovery thereof.
(2) If the bank establishes that the customer failed with
respect to an item to comply with the duties imposed on the
customer by subsection (1) the customer is precluded from
asserting against the bank
[ Vol. 64
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(a) his unauthorized signature or any alteration on the item
if the bank also establishes that it suffered a loss by
reason of such failure; and
(b) an unauthorized signature or alteration by the same
wrongdoer on any other item paid in good faith by the
bank after the first item and statement was available to the
customer for a reasonable period not exceeding fourteen
calendar days and before the bank receives notification
from the customer of any such unauthorized signature
or alteration.
(3) The preclusion under subsection (2) does not apply if
the customer establishes lack of ordinary care on the part of
the bank in paying the item(s).
(4) Without regard to care or lack of care of either the
customer or the bank a customer who does not within one
year from the time the statement and items are made available
to the customer (subsection (1)) discover and report his
unauthorized signature or any alteration on the face or back
of the item or does not within three years from that time dis-
cover and report any unauthorized indorsement is precluded
from asserting against the bank such unauthorized signature
or indorsement or such alteration.
(5) If under this section a payor bank has a valid defense
against a claim of a customer upon or resulting from payment
of an item and waives or fails upon request to assert the defense
the bank may not assert against any collecting bank or other
prior party presenting or transfering the item a claim based
upon the unauthorized signature or alteration giving rise to
the customer's claim.
With respect to the duty outline in section 4-406, Code 31-8-21
now provides as follows:
"No banking institution, including national banking asso-
ciations which has paid and charged to the account of a de-
positor any money on a forged or raised check issued in the
name of such depositor, shall be liable to such depositor for
the amount paid thereon, unless either, (a) within six months
from the notice to such depositor that the vouchers represent-
ing payments charged to the account of such depositor, for
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the period during which such payment was made, are ready
for delivery, or (b) in case no such notice has been given,
within six months after the return to such depositor of the
voucher representing such payment, the depositor shall noti-
fy the banking institution that the check so paid is forged or
raised. The notice referred to may be given by mail to such
depositor at his last known address with postage prepaid. .. ."
No case has been found construing Code 31-8-21. An early
case held that as between banker and customer some superior equity
must intervene to preclude the customer from objecting to an
illegal and unauthorized charge against him even though the ac-
count rendered to the customer may have been retained for a long
time without objection, for the general rule that an account rendered
and retained for a long time becomes an account stated is inapplic-
able to transactions between banker and customer.78 A later deci-
sion recognized that the bank statement and cancelled checks could
became an account stated if retained by the customer without objec-
tion within a reasonable time, but permitted such account stated
to be impeached for the mistake of the bank in not charging hon-
ored checks against the customer's account.79
Because section 4-406 is so much more comprehensive than
Code 31-8-21, detailed comparison is inappropriate. Space could
be more fruitfully used to explain the basic features of section
4-406.
Subsection 4-406(1) states the customer's duty to exercise
reasonable care and promptness to examine his bank statement
and accompanying items (paid in good faith by the bank) to
discover forgeries of his own signature or any alterations and to
notify the bank promptly of any such forgeries or alterations found.
The duty arises when the bank has either (1) sent the statement
and items to the customer, or (2) held the statement and items
available to the customer pursuant to his request or instructions,
or (3) has otherwise in a reasonable manner made the statement
and items available to the customer. Comment 2 states that the
third type of bank action specified is intended to cover unusual
situations as where a bank knows a customer has left a former
address but does not known any new address to which to send
78 McGraw v. Trader's Nat'l Bank, 64 W. Va. 509, 63 S.E. 398 (1908).
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the statement or item or to obtain instructions from the customer.
Note that in such a situation the bank's action must be reasonable.
When the customer makes a claim against the bank for mak-
ing payment of an item containing a forgery of his own signature
or any alteration, subsection 4-406(2) places the burden on the
bank to establish that the customer failed to carry out the duties
imposed upon him by subsection 4-406(1). If the bank success-
fully carries such burden, the two preclusionary rules of subsec-
tion 4-406(2) then come into play against the customer: (a) he
is precluded from asserting a forgery of his own signature or any
alteration provided the bank also establishes that it suffered a loss
because of the customer's failure, such as showing that restitution
could have been obtain from the wrongdoer had the customer
acted with reasonable promptness in giving notice to the bank;"°
and (b) he is precluded from asserting any subsequent forgery
or alteration by the same wrongdoer on any item paid in good faith
by the bank after the first item and the statement was available
to the customer for a period of fourteen calendar days and before
the bank receives notification from the customer of the prior forg-
ery or alteration by the same wrongdoer. The second preclusion-
ary rule adopts the reasoning of the case law that payment of an
additional item or items bearing an unauthorized signature or alter-
ation is a loss suffered by the bank traceable to the customer's
failure to exercise reasonable care in examining his statement and
notifying the bank of an objection to it.8'
Subsection 4-406(3) provides that the two preclusionary rules
are not applicable, however, if the customer establishes that the
bank did not use ordinary care in paying the disputed items.
According to subsection 4-406(4), regardless of the care or
lack of care of either party, the customer is absolutely barred
from asserting rights against the payor bank after the expiration
of specified time limits which commence to run from the date the
statement and items are made available to the customer. After one
year he may not assert a forgery of his own signature or any
alteration on the front or back of an item. After three years he
may not assert a forged indorsement. The difference in time limits
is justified by Comment 5 on the ground that there is little excuse
for a customer not detecting a forgery of his own signature whereas
80 See CLAim, BA=LEY & YOUNG 163.
81 See Comment 3, U.C.C. § 4-406.
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he could not be expected to know the signatures of indorsers and
may be delayed in learning the indorsements were forged. It
should be noted that the specified time limits are not statutes of
limitation on the customer's right of action but relate to the periods
within which he must have notified the bank of a detected forgery
or alteration.
The purpose of subsection 4-406(5), is embracing collecting
banks and prior parties within the protective features of subsection
4-406(4), is to reject case law which sanctioned a device whereby
the customer, after the notification period had elapsed, persuaded
the payor bank to waive any defenses it might have and implead
the collecting bank or a prior party as a third-party defendant for
breach of warranty.82 It has been pointed out that subsection
4-406(5) does not explicitly bar any possible right of action by
the drawer of a check bearing a forged indorsement directly against
a collecting bank, nor does it bar any possible right of action by
the "owner" of the item (such as the payee whose indorsement
is forged) against a collecting or payor bank under section 3-419.83
It should be noted that the time limits specified throughout
section 4-406 could be varied by agreement as permitted by sub-
section 4-103(1). If the agreed time limits were unreasonably
short, however, it is believed by some that the courts would fol-
low decisions under prior law to the effect that no such agreement
had been actually entered into by the bank and the customer, and
that the shortened period was therefore not binding on the cus-
tomer.84
11 Collection of Documentary Drafts
In the interest of completeness and to provide a definite set
of rules for an important function in the bank collection process,
article 4 includes a part 5 dealing with collection of documentary
drafts, which consists of the following four sections:
Section 4-501. Handling of Documentary Drafts; Duty to
Send for Presentment and to Notify Custom-
er of Dishonor.
A bank which takes a documentary draft for collection
must present or send the draft and accompanying documents
for presentment and upon learning that the draft has not been
82 See CrKmax, BAILEY & YoUNG, 165; Comment 7, U.C.C. § 4-406.
83 See CmR.x, BA=LEY & YOUNG 165-66.
84 Ibid. at 166-67.
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paid or accepted in due course must seasonably notify its
customer of such fact even though it may have discounted or
bought the draft or extended credit available for withdrawal
as of right.
Section 4-502. Presentment of "On Arrival" Drafts.
When a draft or the relevant instructions require present-
ment "on arrival", "when goods arrive" or the like, the collect-
ing bank need not present until in its judgment a reasonable
time for arrival of the goods has expired. Refusal to pay or
accept because the goods have not arrived is not dishonor;
the bank must notify its transferor of such refusal but need
not present the draft again until it is instructed to do so or
learns of the arrival of the goods.
Section 4-503. Responsibility of Presenting Bank for Docu-
ments and Goods; Report of Reasons for
Dishonor; Referee in Case of Need.
Unless otherwise instructed and except as provided in Article
5 a bank presenting a documentary draft
(a) must deliver the documents to the drawee on acceptance
of the draft if it is payable more than three days after
presentment; otherwise, only on payment; and
(b) upon dishonor, either in the case of presentment for ac-
ceptance or presentment for payment, may seek and
follow instructions from any referee in case of need des-
ignated in the draft or if the presenting bank does not
choose to utilize his services it must use diligence and
good faith to ascertain the reason for dishonor, must no-
tify its transferor of the dishonor and of the results of its
effort to ascertain the reasons therefor and must request
instructions.
But the presenting bank is under no obligation with respect to
goods represented by the documents except to follow any reason-
able instructions seasonably received; it has a right to reimburse-
ment for any expense incurred in following instructions and to
prepayment of or indemnity for such expenses.
Section 4-504. Privilege of Presenting Bank to Deal With
Goods; Security Interest for Expenses.
(1) A presenting bank which, following the dishonor of a
documentary draft, has seasonably requested instructions but
1962 ]
37
Collins: Bank-Customer Relations under the Uniform Commercial Code
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1962
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
does not receive them within a reasonable time may store, sell,
or otherwise deal with the goods in any reasonable manner.
(2) For its reasonable expenses incurred by action under
subsection (1) the presenting bank has a lien upon the goods
or their proceeds, which may be foreclosed in the same man-
ner as an unpaid seller's lien.
Only two West Virginia cases have been found dealing with
the rights and duties of a bank in dealing with documentary drafts.
It has been held that a bank discounting a draft and receiving
therewith a bill of lading for the goods, against the purchase price
of which the draft is drawn, acquires a special property in such
goods, and has a complete right to have them held as security for
the payment of the draft.8" And a correspondent bank to which
a draft, with bill of lading attached, has been sent for collection
has no right, in the absence of special instructions, to deliver the
draft and bill of loading to the consignee upon an understanding
that he can have his money back if he determines to reject the
goods. " Given such a paucity of case law, it is clear that it would
be to the interest of banks and their customers to enact the more
complete and definitive set of rules for this area provided by part
5 of article 4.
CoNcL~usIoNs
If article 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code were enacted in
West Virginia, its exclusively inter-bank rules for bank collec-
tions would in most instances do no more than give statutory
sanction to existing bank practices. On the other hand, the aspects
of article 4 dealing principally with the customer-payor bank rela-
tionship would represent an extensive and desirable modification
of existing law with respect to such matters as stop payment orders,
stale checks, death of a customer, and the customer's duty to dis-
cover and report forgeries and alterations. Because the bank col-
lection process commonly extends across state lines, the overriding
interest of national uniformity should prevent legislative meddling
with the sections of article 4 dealing exclusively with inter-bank
relationships in the collection process. But the customer-payor bank
relationship, at least in some aspects, does not always have an in-
88 Neil & Ellingham v. Roger Bros. Produce Co., 41 W.Va. 37, 23 S.E.
702 (1895); Old Nat'l Bank v. Peoples Bank, 89 W.Va. 132, 108 S.E. 716
(1921).8 6 01ld Nat'l Bank v. Peoples Bank, supra note 85.
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pact beyond state borders. Accordingly, one should not be too
surprised to find the Legislature extending more certain protection
to the customer by refusing to permit variation by agreement with
respect to some sections of article 4 primarily concerned with the
customer-payor bank relationship, e.g., sections 4-402 (wrongful
dishonor), 4-403 (stop payment orders), 4-404 (stale checks),
4-405 (payment after death), and 4-406 (duty to examine state-
ment, etc.).
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